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Abstract
Any function from a non-empty polytope into itself that is locally gross direction preserving is shown to have the ﬁxed point property.
Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem for continuous functions is a special case. We discuss the application of the result in the area of non-cooperative
game theory.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Almost one century ago Brouwer proved a remarkable result
saying that any continuous function from the m-dimensional
unit ball to itself has a ﬁxed point, a point that is mapped by
the function into itself [3]. The Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem
was one of the early major achievements of algebraic topol-
ogy. This celebrated theorem has been generalized in several
ways. Well-known examples include Schauder, Borsuk-Ulam,
and Kakutani [13,2,9]. For general surveys on the subject, we
refer to [14,8].
In this paper, we give a general condition, called the locally
gross direction preserving property, under which a ﬁxed point
of a function f from an arbitrary non-empty polytope to itself
exists. The condition says that at any point x which is not a
ﬁxed point of f it must hold that the direction of f(x)− x
is grossly preserved in some neighborhood of x, in the sense
that for any y and z in this neighborhood the inner product of
f(y)− y and f(z)− z is non-negative. This novel condition
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allows for various kinds of discontinuities and irregularities of
the function f. On the other hand, any continuous function is
locally gross direction preserving, so that Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem is covered by the result. It is worth pointing out that
our approach is constructive.
Existence results of ﬁxed points for discontinuous functions
were previously given by Tarski and Caristi [16,4]. Our exis-
tence condition differs from Tarski’s theorem in the sense that
the latter theorem is restricted to a weakly increasing function
on a (ﬁnite) sublattice. The monotonicity property is not re-
quired by our condition. Caristi’s theorem concerns functions
satisfying a non-expansion condition, which is also not required
by our condition. It should be noted that a continuous function
does not need to satisfy the conditions in Tarski’s or Caristi’s
theorem and thus both these theorems do not cover Brouwer’s
theorem. We also demonstrate that a locally gross direction
preserving function is not necessarily upper or lower semi-
continuous. To the best of our knowledge, the new theorem
seems to be the ﬁrst that both allows discontinuities and covers
Brouwer’s theorem simultaneously in the single-valued case.
From a practical viewpoint we would like to mention that dis-
continuities may arise naturally in various ﬁelds of study, such
as engineering, economics and game theory; see e.g., [1,5,12].Author's personal copy
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In the latter paper, it is shown that better-reply secure games
have pure strategy Nash equilibria. We will use our theorem
to state some existence results for games with discontinuities,
including the case of two-person non-zero-sum noisy games of
timing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the
theorem and gives some examples to illustrate its generality.
Section 3 presents some game theoretic applications.
2. An existence theorem
Let P be a non-empty polytope in the n-dimensional Eu-
clidean space Rn and let f be a function mapping from P to
itself. We call x∗ ∈ P a ﬁxed point of f if f(x∗) = x∗, i.e., f
maps x∗ into itself. Brouwer proved that if f is continuous on
P, then f has a ﬁxed point.
In this paper, we provide a ﬁxed point theorem that allows for
discontinuities. More precisely, the existence of a ﬁxed point is
guaranteed when f satisﬁes the so-called locally gross direction
preserving property. A discrete version of this property was
originally used in [17] to prove the existence of a ﬁxed point
in case the domain is a discrete set. For x ∈ Rn and >0, let
B(x,) denote the n-dimensional ball in Rn with center x and
radius . Let N denote the set of natural numbers. For h ∈ N,
let Ih denote the index set {1,...,h}. For any x,y ∈ Rn, x y
stands for their inner product.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A function f:P → P is locally gross direction
preserving if for every x ∈ P for which f(x) = x, there exists
>0 such that for every y, z ∈ B(x,) ∩ P, the function f
satisﬁes
(f(y) − y) (f(z) − z)0.
Now we are ready to present the main result of this paper.
The proof is constructive and involves two basic arguments, one
based on Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem and the other one, the
use of locally gross direction preservingness, on basic algebra.
Theorem 2.2. Let P be a non-empty polytope in Rn and let the
function f:P → P satisfy the locally gross direction preserv-
ing property. Then f has a ﬁxed point.
Proof. Take a sequence of simplicial subdivisions, (Tk)k∈N,o f
P with mesh size tending to zero if k goes to inﬁnity, i.e., for
each k ∈ N, Tk is a ﬁnite collection of simplices whose union is
P and for which the intersection of any two simplices is either
empty or a common face of both. Since P is a polytope and
therefore the convex hull of a ﬁnite number of points in Rn,
such a sequence exists; see for example [15].F o rk ∈ N, let
f k denote the piecewise linear approximation of f with respect





where x1,...,xn+1 are the vertices of a simplex in Tk contain-
ing x, and 1,...,n+1 are the unique non-negative numbers





Since the function f k is piecewise linear and therefore contin-
uous on P, the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem implies that for
every k ∈ N there exists a ﬁxed point xk of f k.
Next we consider the sequence of points (xk)k∈N. Since this
sequence is a sequence of points in the compact set P, there
exists a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality
we assume that the sequence (xk)k∈N itself converges to some
x∗ ∈ P.F o rk ∈ N, let k be an n-dimensional simplex in Tk
with vertices xk,1,...,xk,n+1 containing xk. Then there exist
unique non-negative numbers k











If f(x∗)=x∗, then x∗ is a ﬁxed point of f and the theorem has
been proved. Suppose therefore that x∗ is not a ﬁxed point of
f. Then according to the condition of the theorem there exists
∗ >0 such that for all y, z ∈ B(x∗,∗) ∩ P it holds that
(f(y) − y) (f(z) − z)0.
Since the sequence (xk)k∈N converges to x∗ and the mesh size
of Tk converges to zero when k goes to inﬁnity, we obtain that
for every j ∈ In+1 the sequence (xk,j)k∈N converges to x∗.
Hence, there exists k∗ ∈ N such that for all kk∗ it holds that
xk,j ∈ B(x∗,∗) ∩ P for all j ∈ In+1 and therefore
(f(xk,i) − xk,i) (f(xk,j) − xk,j)0, (1)
for all i, j ∈ In+1. On the other hand, since f k(xk) = xk, for




j(f(xk,j) − xk,j) = 0n, (2)




j = 1, there exists j∗ ∈ In+1 satisfying k
j∗ >0.
Premultiplying system (2) with (f(xk,j∗
) − xk,j∗






) (f(xk,j) − xk,j) = 0.
Since, according to inequality (1), every term in this summation










is a ﬁxed point
of f. Author's personal copy
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Observe that the proof distinguishes two possibilities. First
the case where the limit point x∗ of the convergent sequence
(xk)k∈N is a ﬁxed point, and second, for k large enough, any
simplex in the converging sequence has at least one of its ver-
tices as a ﬁxed point. This also implies that the result does not
follow from applying the Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem to the
mapping F deﬁned as the convex closure of f. By deﬁnition of
the convex closure, F is upper semi-continuous and thus there
exists a point x∗ satisfying x∗ ∈ F(x∗). However this proce-
dure does not guarantee that a ﬁxed point of F is also a ﬁxed
point of f. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 2.2 does not follow
as an application of the Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem. This can
be also understood by observing that the Kakutani ﬁxed point
theorem generalizes the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem to corre-
spondences, but it is identical to Brouwer’s theorem when the
correspondence is single-valued. In contrast, Theorem 2.2 gen-
eralizes Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem to discontinuous single-
valued functions. The following lemma shows that Brouwer’s
theorem is indeed a special case of Theorem 2.2, in the sense
that a continuous function satisﬁes the locally gross preserving
condition.
Corollary 2.3. Let P be a non-empty polytope in Rn and let
f:P → P be a continuous function. Then f is locally gross
direction preserving and therefore has a ﬁxed point.
Proof. Take any point x in P and suppose that f(x)  = x.
Clearly, (f(x)−x) (f(x)−x)>0. Consider the function g :
P × P → R deﬁned by
g(y,z)= (f(y) − y) (f(z) − z).
Since the function f is continuous, the function g is also con-
tinuous. So, since g(x,x)>0, there exists >0 so that for
all y, z ∈ B(x,) ∩ P it holds that g(y,z)>0. Hence f is
locally gross direction preserving and the result follows from
Theorem 2.2. 
Corollary 2.3 shows that the locally gross direction preserv-
ing condition indeed gives a natural and novel relaxation of
continuity. Although the condition allows for various kinds of
discontinuities, the condition puts sufﬁcient properties on the
function to guarantee the existence of a ﬁxed point. To illus-
trate and clarify this, we consider the next example of a one-
dimensional function on [0,2], where at any x, f −(x) denotes
the lower limit of f from the left and f +(x) the upper limit of
f from the right.
Example 2.4. Let f:[0,2]→[ 0,2] be continuous at any x ∈
[0,2], except at x = 1. Without loss of generality we assume
that f(x)>xfor all x<1 (otherwise there is a ﬁxed point x∗
satisfying x∗ <1). So, f −(1)1. Now the locally gross direc-
tion preserving condition requires that f(1)1, since f(1)<1
contradicts that for every y and z in some B(1,) it holds that
(f(y)−y) (f(z)−z)0. Further, when f +(1)>1, then there
exists a ﬁxed point x∗ >1. So, suppose f +(1)1. Then the
locally gross direction preserving property requires that either
(i) f(1) = 1 and thus x∗ = 1 is a ﬁxed point, or (ii) f(1)>1
and there exists some y,1<y2, such that f(x)x for all
1<xy. In the latter case there is a ﬁxed point x∗ >1. In
particular it may occur that f(x)= x for all 1<xy, corre-
sponding to the case in the proof that for k large enough any
simplex in the converging sequence has at least one of it ver-
tices as a ﬁxed point. Observe that the locally gross direction
preserving property excludes that f(1)>1 and f +(1)<1 and
also that f(1)<1 and f −(1)>1.
More generally, the locally gross direction preserving con-
dition requires that if x is not a ﬁxed point of f, there exists a
neighborhood of x such that for any two points y and z in this
neighborhood it holds that the vectors f(y)− y and f(z)− z
either make a sharp angle with each other or are orthogonal
to each other, i.e., the direction of these two vectors is grossly
preserved. This condition replaces continuity at x.I fx i saﬁ x e d
point of f nothing about f around x is required.
Locally gross direction preserving does not require that the
function is monotone non-decreasing, a property required by
Tarski’s theorem. On the other hand, a function satisfying
Tarski’s theorem does not need to be locally gross direction
preserving. For example, if f(x)= 1
3(x + 1) for 0x1 and
f(x)= 1
3(x + 3) for 1<x2, then f is monotone increas-
ing on the interval [0,2],b u tf is not locally gross direction
preserving at x = 1.
Itshouldalsobenoticedthatalocallygrossdirectionpreserv-
ingfunctionmaybeneitherlowernoruppersemi-continuous.A
function f :[ 0,1]→[ 0,1] is said to be lower semi-continuous
if for all sequences (xk)k∈N with xk ∈[ 0,1] for all k ∈ N, such
that xk → x it holds that lim infk→∞f(xk)f(x). A func-
tion f :[ 0,1]→[ 0,1] is said to be upper semi-continuous
if for all sequences (xk)k∈N with xk ∈[ 0,1] for all k ∈ N,
such that xk →¯ x it holds that lim supk→∞f(xk)f(¯ x).
Clearly, if f(¯ x)>lim infk→∞f(xk)>¯ x, then f is locally gross
direction preserving at ¯ x,b u tf is not lower semi-continuous
at ¯ x. Similarly, if f(¯ x)<lim supk→∞f(xk)<¯ x,then f is lo-
cally gross direction preserving at ¯ x,b u tf is not upper semi-
continuous at ¯ x.
Finally, we shall extend the theorem to correspondences 
on a non-empty polytope P. We call the function f:P → P a
selection of  if f(x)∈ (x) for every x ∈ P, and x∗ ∈ P a
ﬁxed point of  if x∗ ∈ (x∗).
Theorem 2.5. Let P be a non-empty polytope in Rn and let
:P → P be a correspondence. If there exists a selection f of
 such that for every x ∈ P for which x/ ∈(x), there exists
>0 such that for every y, z ∈ B(x,) ∩ P, the selection f
satisﬁes
(f(y) − y) (f(z) − z)0,
then  has a ﬁxed point.
Proof. Let f be a selection of  satisfying the conditions of
the theorem. Consider the selection g of  which is such that
g(x)=f(x)for every x ∈ P for which x/ ∈(x), and g(x)=x,
otherwise. Let x ∈ P be such that x/ ∈(x) and let >0b eAuthor's personal copy
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such that for every y,z ∈ B(x,) ∩ P,
(f(y) − y) (f(z) − z)0.
Then also, for every y,z ∈ B(x,) ∩ P,
(g(y) − y) (g(z) − z)0.
Indeed, if y ∈ (y) or z ∈ (z), then it holds that (g(y) −
y) (g(z) − z) = 0. If y/ ∈(y) and z/ ∈(z), then we obtain
(g(y) − y) (g(z) − z) = (f(y) − y) (f(z) − z)0.
The function g satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 2.2, so has
a ﬁxed point. This point is also a ﬁxed point of . 
Observe that this theorem does not require the condition in
the Kakutani theorem that (x) is convex for every x ∈ P.
In addition, this new theorem is also a strict and meaningful
generalization of Theorem 2.2. We can illustrate this point by
the following simple example. A correspondence is deﬁned by
(x)={1} for 1x<1
2, (x)={1
2,1} for x= 1
2, and (x)={0}
for 1
2 <x1. Deﬁne a function by f(x)= 1 for 1x 1
2 and
f(x)=0 for 1
2 <x1. So f is a selection of  and moreover f
satisﬁes the condition of Theorem 2.5. So  has a ﬁxed point.
In fact, 1
2 is a ﬁxed point of . Nevertheless, the function f does
not have a ﬁxed point at all.
3. Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
Discontinuities arise naturally in various disciplines, such as
economics and game theory; see, e.g., [1,5,12]. In this section,
we give some results for the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in discontinuous games. A non-cooperative game consists of a
ﬁnite number of players, say, N. Player i, i ∈ IN, has available
a set of actions, denoted by Si. For any i ∈ IN, the set Si
is an mi-dimensional polytope in Rni for some non-negative
integers mi and ni. The cartesian product
 N
i=1Si is called the
strategy space of the game and is denoted by S.An element x=
(x1,...,x N) of S is called a strategy combination. A strategy
combination x ∈ S yields a payoff ui(xi,x −i) to player i,
where x−i = (xj)j =i denotes the actions of players other than
player i in strategy x. A strategy combination x∗ ∈ S is a Nash
equilibrium if for every player i ∈ IN action x∗
i maximizes the
payoff of player i given that the other players choose x∗
−i, i.e.,




−i) for all xi ∈ Si.
For x−i ∈
 
j =iSj, let bi(x−i) be a best reply of player i when
the other players choose actions according to x−i, i.e., bi(x−i)
maximizes ui(xi,x −i) over xi ∈ Si, i ∈ IN. Clearly, x∗ ∈ S
is a Nash equilibrium if bi(x∗
−i) = x∗
i for all i ∈ IN. It follows
immediately from the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem that if every
best reply function bi, i ∈ IN, is continuous, then there exists
a Nash equilibrium. Here we show that a Nash equilibrium
exists under the following condition on the best reply functions,
which is weaker than continuity.
Theorem 3.1. Let S =
 N
i=1Si be the strategy space of a non-
cooperative game, the cartesian product of N non-empty poly-
topes and let bi :
 
j =iSj → Si, for i ∈ IN, be best reply
functions satisfying that for every x ∈ S for which bj(x−j)  =
xj for some j ∈ IN there exists >0 such that for every y,
z ∈ B(x,) ∩ S it holds that
N  
i=1
(bi(y−i) − yi) (bi(z−i) − zi)0.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We deﬁne the function ri from S to Rni by ri(x) =
bi(x−i). The condition in the theorem implies that for all x ∈ S
for which bj(x−j)  = xj for some j ∈ IN there exists >0
satisfying that for every y, z ∈ B(x,) ∩ S we have
N  
i=1
(ri(y) − yi) (ri(z) − zi)0.
For x ∈ S, deﬁne r(x)= (r1(x),...,r N(x)). Clearly, the set S





j=1 nj. Then r is a function from S into itself and for
every x ∈ S for which r(x)  = x there exists >0 satisfying
that for every y, z ∈ B(x,) ∩ S we have
(r(y) − y) (r(z) − z)0,
i.e., the function r satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 2.2 with
P equal to S. Hence, the function r has a ﬁxed point x∗ on S, i.e.,
r(x∗)=x∗. Clearly, a ﬁxed point x∗ of r satisﬁes bi(x∗
−i)=x∗
i
for all i ∈ IN. 
Two remarks are in order. First, using the argument of Corol-
lary 2.3, it is easy to show that if all functions bi are continu-
ous, the conditions in Theorem 3.1 are automatically satisﬁed.
Second, by applying Theorem 2.5, we can easily extend Theo-
rem 3.1 to allow for best response correspondences instead of
best reply functions.
In the rest of this section, we discuss a speciﬁc class of
discontinuous games. In [12] games with discontinuous payoff
functions are studied. For such games best reply functions or
correspondences may not be well deﬁned and so the existence
of a Nash equilibrium cannot be derived from the existence of a
ﬁxed point of the best replies. Reny introduces the class of so-
calledbetter-replysecuregamesandshowsthatsuchagamehas
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Any game with continuous
payoff functions is better-reply secure, but the class also allows
for discontinuities. For instance, as in [12], we consider the
class of two-person, non-zero-sum, noisy games of timing on
the unit square, which can be traced back to [10]. The payoff





 i(xi) if xi <x −i,
i(xi) if xi = x−i,
mi(x−i) if xi >x −i,
where (i) both  i and mi are continuous on [0,1] and  i is
nondecreasing on [0,1] and (ii) for every x ∈[ 0,1] it holdsAuthor's personal copy
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that i(x) ∈ co{ i(x),mi(x)}, the convex hull of  i(x) and
mi(x), and sgn( i(x) − i(x)) = sgn(−i(x) − m−i(x)) with
the sign function sgn(y)=−1 for y<0, sgn(y)=0 for y =0,
and sgn(y)=1 for y>0. For this class of games, [11] presents
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of a mixed
strategy equilibrium, while [12] shows that every such game is
better-reply secure and therefore possesses a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Applying Theorem 2.2 we will establish the existence of a
symmetricNashequilibriuminpurestrategies.Noticethatsince
the payoff functions are not continuous, the best replies are not






1i f  1(x)<m 1(x),
x if  1(x) = m1(x),
0i f  1(x)>m 1(x).
We show that  is locally gross direction preserving on [0,1],
which establishes the existence of a ﬁxed point. Then we prove
that a ﬁxed point of  induces a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. See [7] or [6] for other approaches to show the
existence of a Nash equilibrium by using a ﬁxed point function
not being a best reply function.
First, for every x at which  1(x)<m 1(x) or  1(x)>m 1(x), 
iscontinuousandsocertainlylocallygrossdirectionpreserving.
For every x at which  1(x)=m1(x), x is a ﬁxed point of .A s
a result,  meets the condition of Theorem 2.2 and thus has a
ﬁxed point on [0,1].
Next we show that a ﬁxed point x of  induces the symmetric
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (x,x). We need to consider
three cases.
1. If x = 0, then  1(0)1(0)m1(0), and, using the sign
condition,  2(0)2(0)m2(0),s o
u1(0,0) = 1(0)m1(0) = u1(x1,0) for every x1 >0,
u2(0,0) = 2(0)m2(0) = u2(0,x 2) for every x2 >0.
Hence (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium.
2. If 0<x<1, then  1(x)=1(x)=m1(x), and by the sign
condition  2(x) = 2(x) = m2(x),s of o rx1 <x,
u1(x,x) = 1(x) 1(x1) = u1(x1,x),
where the inequality uses the fact that  1 is non-decreasing, and
for x1 >x,
u1(x,x) = 1(x) = m1(x) = u1(x1,x).
A symmetric argument shows that player 2 does not have a
proﬁtable deviation and thus again (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium.
3. If x = 1, then  1(1)1(1)m1(1),s o 2(1)2(1)
m2(1), and
u1(1,1) = 1(1) 1(x1) = u1(x1,1) for every x1 <1,
u2(1,1) = 2(1) 2(x2) = u2(1,x 2) for every x2 <1.
Again, (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium.
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